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WEI LUO∗ 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 After World War II, the non-proliferation of weapons of massive 
destruction (WMD) and the export controls of conventional weapons and 
civilian and military dual-use technologies have been one of the most 
important focal point of international cooperation. Many international treaties 
have been signed and the international organizations have been established to 
promote these non-proliferation and export control efforts. The industrialized 
countries and the developing countries of China, India, and Pakistan that 
possess nuclear weapons and missile technologies have also enacted domestic 
laws and set up administrative regimes to control these goods and 
technologies from flowing to other countries or undesirable people. Among 
these countries, the United States has been the leader strongly advocating 
non-proliferation of WMD and export controls of civilian and military dual-
use goods. In fact, the United States has established a very sophisticated 
export control system to prevent its weapons and technologies from going to 
the hands of any adversaries. Because the complicities and overlaps of 
international treaties and domestic laws on this topic, it warrants a research 
guide for would-be researchers to walk through the maze of international and 
domestic export control regimes.  
 
 This research guide has two parts. Part One is about the U.S. export 
controls and Part Two focuses on International Non-proliferation cooperation 
and the export controls of several countries that possess WMD technologies.
                                                 
∗ Director of Technical Services and Lecturer in Law, Washington University 
School of Law Library, St. Louis, Missouri.    
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1 The purpose of this research guide is to guide would-be researchers to the 
primary sources (statutes, cases, regulations, and international treaties) and 
the websites of major governmental agencies in charge of export controls and 
the International organizations promoting non-proliferation. The information 
used in Part Two heavily relies on the resources published on the Internet. 
  
PART ONE UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS 
 
 The United States' export control system is a highly regulated and 
institutionalized system designed to protect its national and international 
security interests by regulating which goods and technologies can be 
transferred to certain countries. For instance, when an exporter wants to sell a 
dual-use product (a product which has both commercial and military 
application, i.e., a super-computer system) to a foreign country, she has to 
find out whether such a commodity (including hardware, software, and 
technical data) can be exported to the country where the entity is located, if 
this entity is the end-user of the commodity or is going to re-export the 
commodity to another foreign end user, and how to obtain an export license. 
If the exporter fails to comply with the law, she may lose export privileges or 
subject to fines and/or face imprisonment. Today, posting controlled technical 
data on an unsecured website on the Internet could also be treated as violating 
the U.S. export control law. 
 
1. FEDERAL STATUTES 
 
 Export control law has been essentially a matter of federal law, with 
no state law on the subject, because only the federal government has the 
power to regulate foreign trade issues. This power was granted by the U.S. 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3.2  
 
1.1 Dual-Use Goods Export Controls 
 
 Before 1940, the United States had no legal mechanism for 
controlling peacetime export of militarily significant products to potential 
enemies. In 1940, when World War II began, the Congress gave the President 
                                                 
1 Some data listed in Part One of this article were published in Wei Luo, A 
Pathfinder to U.S. Export Control Laws and Regulations (Hein, 1994). The author 
thanks Hein for allowing reuse of the data in this article. 
2 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which reads: “The Congress shall have Power ... To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
Indian Tribes.” 
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authority to control the export of militarily significant goods and technologies 
through the Act to Expedite the Strengthening of the National Defense.3 By 
1949, the West and U.S. viewed the former Soviet Union and its allies, 
including the People's Republic of China (PRC) as potential military 
adversaries. Accordingly, the Congress enacted the Export Control Act of 
1949,4 to give the president the power to impose export controls in order to 
further national security and foreign policy objectives, or to preserve goods in 
short supply. In 1969, the Congress passed the Export Administration Act of 
1969,5 changing the general export control policy from “strategic embargo” to 
“qualified promotion of exports”, in order to gain the international exporting 
market share for U.S. businesses. 
 
(1) Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979  
 
 On September 29, 1979, President Carter signed into law the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (EAA),6 which superseded the EAA of 1969. 
Like the previous acts, the EAA of 1979 still empowers the president to 
regulate exports of goods and technology from the U.S. in order to protect 
national security, further foreign policy, and reserve needed resources.7 In 
addition, the EAA authorized the president to establish a list of controlled 
countries ranging from those receiving favorable treatment to those whose 
imports are severely curtailed.8 Since the enforcement of the EAA needs 
highly trained experts to track and regulate dual-use technologies, the 
Congress delegated the authority to maintain a Commodity Control List 
(CCL) which contains items subject to export restriction, to the Secretary of 
Commerce.9  
 
 Since the EAA bases its strictures on the country of destination and 
the sophistication of the technology to be exported, the EAA can be used to 
further U.S. foreign policy goals by manipulating the list of proscribed 
                                                 
3 Ch. 508, 54 Stat. 712 (1940) (expired in 1949). 
4 Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1964) 
(expired 1969)). 
5 Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 
2401-2413 (1976) (expired 1979)). 
6 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 
2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). 
7 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
8 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
9 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
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technologies or countries.10 So, this mechanism of the EAA adds complexity 
to the export control system and makes it hard for exporters to follow its laws 
and regulations.  
 
 The EAA was supposed to expire on September 30, 1990.11 On that 
same day, former President Bush issued an executive order to extend the EAA 
until the Congress enacted legislation re-authorizing the Act.12 A month later, 
the House and Senate both reached agreement on legislation to re-authorize 
the EAA on October 23, 1990.13 However, the Congress has never renewed 
the EAA since then. Subsequently, the Presidents of the U.S. have annually 
issued an executive order to keep the EAA alive by declaring the national 
emergency according to the power vested by the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.).14 
 
 The IEEPA provides for the automatic termination of a national 
emergency, prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the president has to 
publish in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating 
that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. 
Therefore, the president has to do so every year to keep the EAA alive.15 
 
(2) Major Amendments and Additions to the EAA 
 
                                                 
10 Peter S. Malloy, Controls on the Export of Military Sensitive Technology: 
National Security Imperative or U.S. Industry Impediment? 18 Rutgers Computer & 
Tech. L.J. 841, 845 (1992). 
11 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (1988). 
12 Exec. Order No. 12,730, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1991), reprinted as amended in 50 
U.S.C. § 1701 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
13 Export Controls: House, Senate Conferees Reach Agreement on Legislation to 
Extend Export Controls, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1607 (Oct. 24, 1990). 
14 Cecil Hunt, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in Coping with U.S. Export 
Controls 2004 21, 23 (PLI, 2004).  See also the Executive Orders of Continuation of 
Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations issued by the presidents between 
1991 and 2005 in Presidential Documents. 
15 Continuation of Emergency regarding Export Control Regulations: 
Communication from the President of the United States Transmitting Notification that 
the Emergency regarding Export Control Regulations Is to Continue in Effect beyond 
August 17, 2005, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1622(d). Y 1.1/7:109-51 (Washington : U.S. 
G.P.O., 2005). This document is also available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_documents& docid=f: hd051.109 (last visited Oct. 
7, 2007). 
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 Even though more than three dozen bills have been introduced to 
Congress to reform the EAA, none of them have been passed since 1985. 
There have been only four major amendments and additions to the EAA.  
   
1. Export Administration Act of 1985,16 which extended the EAA of 
1979 and corrected some of the inefficient export control practices 
which could injure national industrial interests.17  
2. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,18 which again 
amended the EAA in an effort to further ease exporters from the 
constraints of overly restrictive export laws by reducing the items on 
the commodity control list and simplifying the review procedure of 
the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Controls (CoCom).19  
3. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991,20 which 
brings the control of missile technology within the aegis of domestic 
export control in order to prevent and suppress the exportation of 
technology which may contribute to the proliferation of missiles 
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.21  
4. Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
Act of 1991,22 which amended the EAA in an effort to sanction and 
prohibit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.23 
1.2 Defense Articles and Services Export Controls 
 
(1) The Earlier Acts 
 
 The U.S. export control system originated from the Trading with the 
Enemy Act of 1917, which restricted munitions exports to the enemy in the 
                                                 
16 Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 
2401-2410 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
17 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 108-127. 
18 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§§ 2401 et seq. (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
19 Id. and see also John B. Geddes, The 1988 Trade Act and the Effect on United 
States Export Controls to the People's Republic of China, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 611, 
618-19 (Spring 1989). 
20 Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1485 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401 et seq. 
(Supp. III 1991)). 
21 Id. and see also Molloy, supra note 15. 
22 Pub. L. No. 102-182, 105 Stat. 1233 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §2405(m) 
(Supp. III 1991)). 
23 Id. 
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period of spanning World War I to World War II.24 However, the U.S. 
government did not establish an arms export control regime until 1935 when 
the Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1935,25 which gave the president 
for the first time a legal basis for instituting a formal system to control 
defense articles and services export.26 Subsequently, the following related 
laws have been enacted to control the defense articles and services export:  
 
• The Neutrality Act of 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (1939) (codified as 
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 441 et seq. (2005)). 
• The Mutual Defense Assistant Act of 1949, ch. 626, 63 Stat. 714 (1949). 
• The Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 479, 65 Stat. 373 (1951) (codified 
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 272(b) et seq. (1988)). 
• The Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, Stat. 832 (1954), (codified as 
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1754, 1783, 1973 (1988)). 
• The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 
(1961) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 276 et seq. (2005)). 
• The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 
(1968) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2341 et seq. (2005)). 
• The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 
1976, Pub. L. 94-321, (codified as 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. (2005)). 
 
(2) Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
 
 Since 1976, the U.S. statutory authority for defense articles and 
services export controls has been the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 
1976,27 which continues to authorize the president's power to control the 
import and export of munitions and services. In addition, this act redefined the 
president to designate the items of defense articles and services subject to 
export control. 
 
 The AECA was amended in 1996 to cover brokering activity by all 
persons (except officers/employees of the U.S. Government acting in an 
                                                 
24 John Heinz, U.S. Strategic Trade: An Export Control System for the 1990s, 7 
(Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1991). Trading with the Enemy Act, 1917, ch. 40 
Stat 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1988); 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-
6, 7-39 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). 
25 Ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (1935). 
26 Joseph P. Smaldone, U.S. Commercial Arms Exports: Policy, Process and 
Patterns, in Coping with U.S. Export Controls 1989, 185, 186-88 (New York, N.Y.: 
Practicing Law Institute, 1989). 
27 Also called Foreign Military Sales Act (Pub.L. 90-629, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 
1320, codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 2797b-1 – 2799aa-1). 
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official capacity) with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer 
of any defense articles or defense service on the U.S. Munitions List of the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, which is discussed below). 
This coverage is not limited to U.S. origin defense articles/services, but can 
also extend to brokering involving foreign defense articles and services. 
Under the ITAR, persons engaged in the business of brokering activities are 
required to register with the Department of State and obtain the applicable 
authorizations for each brokering transaction. Brokering activities involving 
non-munitions items, where known by the perpetrator to be destined for 
WMD or missile activities, would also be subject to U.S. catch-all controls. 
1.3 Nuclear Equipment and Technology Export Controls 
 
(1) Atomic Energy Act 
 
 The Atomic Energy Act of 194628 was the first statutory law to 
establish a control system to regulate the export and import of any fissionable 
materials and technical data. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was amended 
entirely by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,29 which has also been amended 
many times since 1954. The Atomic Energy Act authorized the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to 
control the exports of nuclear equipment and technology, such as nuclear 
reactors and plants for producing nuclear materials. Some nuclear materials 
that can be used for civilian purposes and on the “Nuclear Referral List” are 
under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department.30  
 
(2) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
 
 On July 1, 1968, the United States and the former Soviet Union, with 
some other nations, concluded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons31 (which has been open for signature since then) in order to prevent 
the nuclear proliferation. As of 2000, a total of 187 parties have joined the 
Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.32 More countries have 
                                                 
28 Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), (formerly codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1801-1819). 
29 Also called McMahon Atomic Energy Act (Aug. 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 919), 
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
30 10 C.F.R. § 110 (2005). 
31 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 715 (1954), codified as 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297 (2005). 
32 The number of joined parties is from the United Nations Website at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/. 
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ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement. 
This is a testament to the Treaty's significance. In 1970, this treaty became in 
force for the United States when the Congress ratified the Treaty.  
 
(3) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
 
 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 197833 is one of the 
most important acts that amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in a number 
of significant ways with respect to U.S. nuclear cooperation and non-
proliferation with foreign countries.34 In addition to tightening U.S. nuclear 
export control with stricter criteria, the NNPA also requires any U.S. 
corporations or citizens who directly or indirectly engage in the production of 
special nuclear material outside the United States to be authorized by the 
Secretary of Energy.35 
1.4 Export Controls on Terrorists-Supporting or Embargoed Countries 
 
 Besides the above listed federal statutes targeted on the exports of 
due-used goods, weapons, and nuclear equipments and materials, the U.S. 
export control system also included the statutes controlling the trading with 
specific terrorists-supporting or embargoed countries. The following are a list 
of major federal statues in this area. 
 
(1) Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity Act of 1996 
 
 The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 sets a general policy that would 
denies export license of nearly all goods to be shipped to Cuba except the 
shipping of medical items and other humanitarian items that may be approved 
based on case-by case review.36 In addition, Cuban Liberty and Democratic 
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 imposes economic embargo on Cuba 
including all restrictions on trade or transactions with, and travel to or from 
                                                 
33 Pub. L. 95-242, 92 Stat. 120 (1978) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3201 
et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2074 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. § 3282 (1988)). 
34 Carlton E. Thorne, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Considerations and the SNEC 
Process, in Coping with U.S. Export Controls 1989, 313, 313 (New York, N.Y: 
Practicing Law Institute, 1989). 
35 John M. Rooney, the U.S. Department of Energy's Role in Export Control and 
Nuclear Nonproliferation, in Coping With U.S. Export Controls 1990, 303, 304-06 
(New York, N.Y: Practicing Law Institute, 1990). 
36 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-484, Div. A, Title XVII, Oct. 
23, 1992, 106 Stat. 2575), codified at 22 USC §§ 6001 to 6010 (2005). 
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Cuba, and all restrictions on transactions in property in which Cuba or 
nationals of Cuba have an interest.37 
(2) Statues Related Embargos on Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria 
 
 Congress has at least enacted the following laws to impose economic 
embargo and export controls on Iran. Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990,38 Iran-Iraq 
Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992,39 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 
1996,40 Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000,41 Iran Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act of 2002,42 and Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act of 2003.43 Since Congress enacted the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Reconstruction and International Assistance Act of 2003,44 many restrictions 
on exports to Iraq and Afghanistan have been eased. 
 
(3) Tiananmen Square Sanctions 
 
 On February 16, 1990, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991.45 Title IX of this law, 
Congress condemned the Chinese regime brutally crackdown the Chinese 
peaceful demonstrators in June 1989 and asked the president of the United 
States to (1) suspend all exports of items on the United States Munitions List, 
including arms and defense related equipment to China; (2) oppose the further 
liberalization of the guidelines of the CoCom regarding trade with China; (3) 
take no further action to implement the agreement for cooperation between 
the United States and China relating to the uses of nuclear energy, thereby 
foreclosing the issuance of new licenses;  and (4) suspend the license for the 
export of any United States manufactured satellites for launch on launch 
vehicles owned by China, including the two Aussat satellites and the Asiasat 
satellite.46 
                                                 
37 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (also 
called Helms-Burton Act) (Pub. L. No. 104-114, Mar. 12, 1996, 110 Stat. 785), 
codified at 22 USC §§ 1643l, 1643m, 6021 to 6024, 6031 to 6046, 6061 to 6067, 
6081 to 6085, 6091 (2005). 
38 Pub. L. No. 101-513, Title V, §§ 586, 586a to 586j, 104 Stat. 2047 (1990). 
39 Pub. L. No. 102-484, Div. A, Title XVI, 106 Stat. 2571 (1992). 
40 Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996). 
41 Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000). 
42 Pub. L. No. 107-228, Div. B, Title XIII, Subtitle D (§§ 1341 to 1345), 116 Stat. 
1451 (2002). 
43 Pub. L. No. 108-175, 117 Stat. 2482 (2003). 
44 Pub. L. No. 108-106, Title II, 117 Stat. 1222 (2003). 
45 Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104 Stat. 15 (1990). 
46 Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 901, 104 Stat. 15, 901 (1990). 
456 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 35.3 
 
 
2. Congressional Committees 
 
There are two major congressional committees having jurisdiction over export 
controls. They are: 
 
(1) The House Committee on International Relations (used to be called the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs) oversees the affairs regarding export 
controls, including nonproliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear 
hardware. Its website is at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_ relations/. 
The Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-proliferation (used to 
be called the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment) is 
the specific subordinate committee in charge of measures and legislation 
pertaining to export controls. The subcommittee chairman is Rep. Edward R. 
Royce (Republican from California) as of January 2006. Its website is at 
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/itnhear.htm. 
 
(2) The Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance under the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is the specific 
subordinate committee in charge of export controls. Its website is at 
http://banking.senate.gov/. 
 
3. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 
3.1 Dual-Use Goods Export Controls -- Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR) 
 
 The EAA authorized the Department of Commerce to create a set of 
regulations to implement the export control law. The popular name for these 
regulations is the Export Administration Regulations or EAR in short. The 
current EAR were rewritten in 1996 and are codified as 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-799 
(2005) (approximately 700 page long).47 The GPO created and maintains a 
website for EAR at http://www.access.gpo.gov /bis/index.html, which 
includes all the relevant C.F.R. sections and the rules published in Federal 
Register affecting the EAR. The EAR regulates not only the exports of dual-
use goods, software, and technology from the U.S. but also the re-exports of 
U.S.-origin items from other countries, sales of foreign made products 
containing U.S.-origin components or derived from U.S.-origin technology, 
and disclosure of U.S.-origin technology to foreign nationals.48 
                                                 
47 61 Fed. Reg. 12734 (Mar. 25, 1996). 
48 Eric L. Hirschhorn, the Export Control and Embargo Handbook 6 (New York: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 2nd., 2005). See also 15 C.F.R. § 730.1 (2005). 
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3.2 Defense Articles and Services Export Controls -- International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
 
Under the AECA, the Department of State exercised the authority on the 
president's behalf by promulgating a set of rules to control munitions and 
defense services exports.49 The popular name for the rules is International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which are codified as 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-
130 (2005) and administrated by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
(DDTC) under the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the State 
Department.50 The defense articles and services subjected to the export 
control are listed on the United States Munitions List (USML).51 
3.3 Nuclear Equipments and Technology Export Controls 
 
 The federal regulations regarding the nuclear equipment and 
technology export controls are scattered among several titles of the C.F.R. 
The main regulations are listed as follows. For some nuclear equipments and 
technologies, if they are on the “Nuclear Referral List,” they are under the 
jurisdiction of the Commerce Department; if they appear on the U.S. 
Munitions List, they are under the jurisdiction of the State Department.52  
Exporting all other nuclear equipment is under the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) while exporting nuclear technology is under the Energy 
Department.53 
 
• TITLE 10--Energy Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 
110--Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material § 110, 10 
C.F.R. §§ 110 et seq (2005);  
• TITLE 32--National Defense Chapter I--Office of The Secretary of 
Defense Part 223--Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled 
Nuclear Information (Dod Ucni), 32 C.F.R. §§ 223 et seq (1993); 
• TITLE 10-- Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 170--
Fees For Facilities, Materials, Import And Export Licenses, And 
Other Regulatory Services Under The Atomic Energy Act Of 1954, 
As Amended, 10 C.F.R. §  170 (2005); 
                                                 
49 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-2994 (2005). 
50 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (2005). 
51 22 D.F.R. § 121.1 (2005). 
52 Eric L. Hirschhorn, the Export Control and Embargo Handbook 251 (2005). 
53 Id. 
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• TITLE 10--Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 75--
Safeguards On Nuclear Material--Implementation Of US/IAEA 
Agreement, 10 C.F.R. §  75 (2005); 
• TITLE 10--Chapter I--Nuclear Regulatory Commission Part 10--
Interpretations, 10 C.F.R. § 8 (2005). 
4. Presidential Executive Orders or Proclamations 
 
 The presidents have often spoken out on export controls because the 
export control laws authorize them to regulate the export controls. As 
indicated above, almost every year since 1990, the presidents have issued the 
executive orders entitled Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export 
Control Regulations to keep Export Administration Act effective. The 
presidents also issued other executive orders to implement export control 
laws. For example, on November 16, 1990, the former President Bush 
released an executive order, which was entitled “Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Proliferation,” to initiate multilateral coordination on chemical and 
biological weapons non-proliferation, and to impose severe sanctions against 
foreign citizens or foreign countries with respect to chemical and biological 
weapons proliferation.54 
 
 Looking for the current presidential executive orders or proclamations 
on export controls, one can go to the Federal Register or Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents, which has a table of contents for each issue, and 
separate cumulative indexes published quarterly, semiannually and annually. 
The subject term of “export controls” is indexed under “Commerce, 
international”. Both of Federal Register or Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents are freely available on GPO’s website at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/executive.html#presidential. Presidential executive 
orders and proclamations can also be retrieved from WESTLAW’s President 
Documents database (PRES) or LEXIS' GENFED library/PRESDC file (the 
presidential documents in LEXIS are from January 1981 to present only). 
 
5. Governmental Commissions or Advisory Groups 
5.1 Export Administration Review Board 
 
                                                 
54 Exec. Order No. 12735, 3 C.F.R. 313 (1990), reprinted as amended in 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1701, et seq (1988 & Supp III 1991). 
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 To resolve any possible interagency disputes, the Export 
Administration Review Board was established by Executive Order No. 11533 
of June 4, 1970 issued by former President Carter, and subsequently 
continued by several other presidents. The board consists of the cabinet-level 
secretaries and the heads of other government offices including the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency also serve 
as nonvoting members of the board. The board also considers export licensing 
policies, and actions, and advises the Secretary of Commerce on export 
licensing.55 
5.2 President's Export Council  
 
 This council advises the president on all aspects of export trade 
including export controls, as well as promotion and expansion. The committee 
in charge of export controls is called Subcommittee on Export Administration 
which is separately chartered and administered by the Bureau of Industry and 
Security at the Department of Commerce. The website of the council is 
located at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/pec/index.html. Some of its 
recommendation letters regarding the export control issues and regulations 
can be found at its website. 
 
 The twenty-eight private-sector members of the Council are 
appointed by the president. They serve, “at the pleasure of the president,” with 
no set term of office. As of 2006, Five United States Senators and five 
members of the House of Representatives are appointed to the Council by the 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, respectively. The 
Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Treasury, State, and Homeland 
Security; the Chairman of the Export-Import Bank of the United States; the 
U.S. Trade Representative; and the Administrator of the Small Business 
Administration are also members of the Council. 
 
6. Federal Agencies and Their Responsibilities 
 
 The export control laws described above have authorized the 
following federal agencies to implement these laws and impose the penalties 
on violators. To effectively enforce the export controls, the involved federal 
agencies also need to coordinate cohesively.  
                                                 
55 Exe. Order No. 12981, 60 Fed. Reg. 62981-62984 (Dec. 8, 1995). 
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6.1 Department of Commerce: Bureau of Industry and Security 
 
 Under the 1985 Export Administration Amendment Act, the dual-use 
goods exports are controlled by Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) 
[formerly the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)] under the Department 
of Commerce. The primary responsibilities of the BXA are to establish and 
maintain the Commodity Control List (CCL), classify the Country Groups for 
export controlled destinations, and review and issue the validated licenses 
upon individual exporters' requests. Its website is located at http: 
www.bis.doc.gov/. 
6.2 Departments of States: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
 
 According to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (codified in 22 
U.S.C. §§ 2778-2780) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) (22 CFR Parts 120-130), the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
(DDTC), the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the Department of States, 
is in charge of controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles 
and defense services covered by the United States Munitions List. It has 
among its primary missions (a) taking final action on license applications for 
defense trade exports and (b) handling matters related to defense trade 
compliance, enforcement, and reporting. Its website is located at 
http://www.pmdtc.org/. 
6.3 Department of Defense: Defense Thread Reduction Agency 
 
 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was created by as an agency 
under the Department of Defense on October 1, 1998.56 Its mission is to 
safeguard America and its allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing 
capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat, and mitigate its 
effects.  It is responsible for the development and implementation of policies 
on international transfers of defense-related technology, and it also reviews 
certain dual-use export license applications referred by the Department of 
Commerce. Its website is at http://www.dtra.mil/index.cfm. 
                                                 
56 Joseph P. Harahan & Robert J. Bennett, Creating the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency 17-18 (2002).  
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6.4 Department of Energy: Office of Export Control Policy and 
Cooperation 
 
 The Office of Export Control Policy and Cooperation is an office of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA was 
established by Congress in 2000 and is a semi-autonomous agency within the 
U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security 
through the military application of nuclear energy. NNSA maintains and 
enhances the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; works to reduce global danger 
from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and 
effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological 
emergencies in the U.S. and abroad. The website of the NNSA is located at 
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/index.htm. 
6.5 Department of the Treasury: Office of Foreign Assets Control  
 
 The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade 
sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against 
targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and 
those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and national emergency 
powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose 
sanctions on transactions and freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction. 
Many of the sanctions are based on the United Nations and other international 
mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied 
governments. The website of the OFAC is at 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/, which provides information 
on these sanctions as well as the complete list of Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons (the “SDN list”).   
6.6 Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Export Controls and International 
Organizations Section 
 
 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is an autonomous 
agency not a part of the Executive Branch. The Export Controls and 
International Organizations Section is responsible for planning, developing, 
and implementing regulatory cooperation programs with international 
organizations. The Section licenses the exports and imports of nuclear 
equipment and material after interagency review with the Departments of 
Energy, State, Defense, and Commerce and the Arms Control and 
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Disarmament Agency. It also participates in international nuclear safeguard 
activities, recommends policies, and coordinates NRC efforts with Executive 
Branch agencies and other entities. The Website of the NRC is located at 
http://www.nrc.gov/. 
6.7 Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection  
 
 U.S. customs officials have the authority to check any exporting 
cargos against their export license at the borders to make sure the exports 
complied with the export control laws. For more information about the 
responsibilities of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, check out its website 
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/export/. 
 
7. PRINCIPAL CASES 
 
 Due to the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act under which the Commerce Department can be exempted from judicial 
review for its administrative decisions on export controls,57 there were almost 
no opportunities for aggrieved exporters to obtain judicial review of the 
actions taken by the federal export control agencies. Therefore, there are few 
cases brought by aggrieved exporters to challenge the Department of 
Commerce in the federal courts. However, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended the EAA so as to provide some limited 
judicial review of the sanctions imposed by federal export control agencies.58 
Thus, searching judicial opinions should not be ignored when conducting 
legal research on export controls. Listed below, in reverse chronological 
order, are six recent leading cases that dealt with different aspects of the 
constitutionality of the export control laws and other issues as well. 
7.1 Judicial Review of Decisions Made by Export Control Agencies 
 
(1) U.S. v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1992)  
 
                                                 
57 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). See also Moller-Butcher v. U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of Export Admin., 12 F.3d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1994), in which, the 
D.C. Circuit Court held that the Export Administration Act precluded judicial review 
of sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of Commerce on an exporter. 
58 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1861 (1988).
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 In Bozarov, the court held that: (1) the Export Administration Act is 
lack of provision for judicial review of decisions made by the Secretary of 
Commerce did not render the Act violating the non-delegation doctrine of the 
constitution, and (2) lack of judicial review did not violate defendant's due 
process rights. 
 
(2) Dart v. U.S., 848 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
 
 In Dart, the Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, held that: (1) although the 
sanctions imposed by the Secretary of Commerce are generally precluded 
from judicial review, if the functions exercised by the Secretary of Commerce 
are not specified in Export Administration Act, such functions were subject to 
limited judicial review, and (2) the Secretary of Commerce's reversal of an 
administrative law judge's decision exceeded Secretary's authority under 
Export Administration Act. 
 
(3) Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
 
 In 1985, Iran Air purchased two signal generators originated from the 
United States through a German company and shipped them to Iran without 
obtaining re-export license. In 1990, the Acting under Secretary of Commerce 
for Export Administration's found the re-exporting violated the Export 
Administration Act and imposed $100,000 civil penalty on Iran Air. However, 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to hear the case ruled that the 
Export Administration Act authorized sanctions only for knowing violations. 
Because the Office of Export Enforcement had neither alleged nor proved that 
Iran Air knowingly violated the law, the ALJ dismissed the charge. A federal 
district court upheld the argument of the Acting under Secretary of Commerce 
for Export Administration that the ALJ's interpretation of the Act clashed with 
the Department's firm position that “knowledge” is not a requirement in a 
civil penalty case. Iran Air appealed the case. The Court of Appeals, D.C. 
Circuit, held that: 
 
…the Under Secretary may not reverse fact findings made by an ALJ, 
but remains the final administrative arbiter on questions of law and 
policy. We therefore affirm the Under Secretary's ruling that Iran Air 
violated the Export Administration Act, but we vacate the sanctions 
imposed and remand the case to the Under Secretary for a reasoned 
determination of the appropriate sanction consistent with the ALJ's 
assessment of the facts and the circumstances of Iran Air's violation. 
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7.2 Constitutional Issues Related to Export Control Laws 
 
(1) U.S. v. Soussi, 316 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2002), certiorari denied, 538 U.S. 
971 (2003) 
 
 In Soussi, the defendant purchased thirty trailers for a Libya company 
and tried to ship the trailers to Libya via Italy without obtaining an export 
authorization. The defendant was convicted by jury in the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado, of willfully, knowingly, and 
unlawfully participating in transaction involving export of goods to Libya in 
violation of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The 
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals of 10th Circuit held that: (1) 
defendant's conduct constituted violation of IEEPA even though trailers he 
shipped to Libya never reached their destination; (2) executive order and 
related regulations under IEEPA were not unconstitutionally vague as applied 
to defendant. 
 
(2) U.S. v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1990) 
 
 In Mandel, the court held that the Commerce Secretary's decision to 
place item on the Commodity Control List was a political question not subject 
to judicial review. 
 
(3) U.S. v. Mechanic, 809 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1987) 
 
 In Mechanic, the defendants were convicted of attempting to export a 
microwave calibration device without a validated export license. In appeal, 
they raised a constitutional challenge to the regulation (15 C.F.R. § 387.3(a) 
(1985)) which imposed criminal sanctions on those attempting to export 
controlled substances by contesting the regulation exceeded the delegation of 
authority granted under the EAA. However, the court held that the regulation 
imposing criminal sanctions for attempting to violate export controls did not 
exceed delegation of power granted under the EAA.  
7.3 Statute of Limitation 
 
U.S. v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
 
 In 1994, McDonnell Douglas and Douglas Aircraft Company (jointly, 
“MDC”) agreed to sell some machining tools made in 1960s from a closed 
aircraft manufacturing plant in Ohio to China National Aero-Technology 
Import and Export Corporation (“CATIC”).  Because these machining tools 
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can be used to make aircraft parts, MDC applied for export licenses from the 
Department of Commerce. The Department of Commerce issued the export 
licenses for these tools with a condition that MDC must provide quarterly 
reports to the Department of Commerce about the location of these machine 
tools and how they were being used. After these tools being shipped to 
Shanghai, China, CATIC moved six of them to its Nanchang facility without 
informing MDC.  
 
 On April 4, 1995, shortly after MDC's required quarterly inspection 
of the CATIC facility, MDC reported to the Department of Commerce that the 
machine tools had been diverted to four different locations, including the 
Nanchang facility. The government initiated an investigation, which 
culminated in the indictment returned on October 19, 1999. The indictment 
charged Hitt, the MDC’s director in China, MDC, CATIC, and two CATIC 
employees with conspiring to violate the laws of the United States (18 U.S.C. 
§371) and with aiding and abetting such a conspiracy (18 U.S.C. §2) in 
connection with the allegedly fraudulent acquisition of the export licenses and 
making false and misleading statements to the Department of Commerce after 
the export licenses were issued. 
 
 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (107 
F.Supp.2d 29) dismissed conspiracy count on the ground that charge was 
time-barred under the five-year statute of limitations. Government appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Rogers, Circuit Judge, held that conspiracy on the part 
of American and Chinese defendants to deceive the United States into issuing 
export licenses for aircraft machinery tools that were subject to export 
controls ended with issuance of export licenses, not on a later date when tools 
were actually exported and delivered, and thus indictment of executive for his 
role was time-barred when not brought up within five years after the export 
occurred. 
 
7.4 Issues Related to the Freedom of Information Act 
 
(1) Lessner v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 827 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987)  
 
 In Lessner, the plaintiff challenged the Department of Commerce's 
refusal to supply him, upon his Freedom of Information Act request, with 
names of businesses and individuals granted licenses to export to the Soviet 
Union. The Court of Appeals held that such information constituted 
“information obtained for the purpose of consideration of, or concerning, 
license application” under the EAA, and thus, was exempt from disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act. 
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(2) U.S. v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989)  
 
 In Posey, the defendant is in the business of selling technical data 
relating to military and commercial aircraft to contractors located both in the 
United States and abroad. The information he sells is unclassified, and he 
generally obtains it from the government through requests under the Freedom 
of Information Act. In 1985, the FBI became aware that appellant was 
arranging sales of technical data to purchasers in South Africa. The 
government obtained a wiretap order from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court upon a finding that the defendant was an “agent of a 
foreign power”. The wiretap confirmed that the defendant was arranging to 
ship military technology manuals to South Africa. In early 1987, the 
defendant was arrested after an associate was caught with aircraft manuals at 
the airport, boarding a flight to Argentina en route to South Africa. The 
defendant was charged with violation of export control law and was 
convicted.  
 
 The defendant appealed to his conviction of a violation of the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) and the Arms Export Control 
Act (AECA). One of the defendant arguments is that the First Amendment 
bars the government from restricting the export of information that is already 
available to the public. He insists that the data he sent abroad was available 
under the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore could be legally 
obtained by virtually anyone in the world. He contends that the First 
Amendment prohibits the application of the AECA and CAAA to the export 
of such publicly available information. Therefore, under the First 
Amendment, he should not be convicted of all the charges. However, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and held that the First Amendment 
did not bar defendant's conviction for exporting non-classified technical 
munitions information available to public under either AECA or CAAA. 
7.4 Conviction Requirements under the Export Control Law 
 
U.S. v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. Mo. 1987), certiorari denied, 486 U.S. 
1022 (1988) 
 
 In Gregg, the defendant tried to export night vision goggles usable for 
military purposes and military aircraft communication radios component parts 
of a missile system without applied for State Department license. He was 
charged and convicted by the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri. The 8th Circuit Court held the Conviction of defendant’s 
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violation of export control law meets the prerequisites set under 50 U.S.C.S. 
app. §2410, which requires proof of (1) willfulness; (2) violation of the EAA 
of 1979 or a regulation issued there under; (3) and knowledge that the exports 
involved will be used for the benefit of, or that the destination or intended 
destination of the goods or technology involved is, any controlled country or 
any country to which exports are controlled for foreign policy purposes.  
 
8. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS WITH DEGREES 
8.1 The Center for International Trade and Security at the University of 
Georgia  
 
 The University of Georgia established the Center for East-West Trade 
Policy to monitor and evaluate U.S. and Western alliance policies governing 
East-West trade, particularly the role of governments, export controls, and 
technology transfer.  In 1995, the center was renamed the Center for 
International Trade and Security. The Center routinely held conferences on 
trade and security, nonproliferation of WMD, and terrorism issues. The center 
also offers graduate programs in export controls and nonproliferation. The 
center publishes various reports on the topic and Export Control Newsletter, 
which is a monthly digest of export control-related news and developments 
throughout the world. Many of these publications can be found at its website. 
The center’s address and phone are 204 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602, 
706-542-2985, and website: http://www.uga.edu/cits/.  
8.2 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies  
 
 The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) was established at the 
Monterey Institute of International Studies (at http://www.miis.edu) in 1989 
to combat the spread of WMD by training the next generation of 
nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and 
analysis. CNS is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United 
States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. 
Today, CNS has a full-time staff of more than 40 specialists and over 50 
graduate student research assistants located in offices in Monterey, 
Washington, DC, and Almaty, Kazakhstan. CNS is organized into five 
research programs: the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation 
Program, the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, the International 
Organization and Nonproliferation Program, the Newly Independent States 
Nonproliferation Program, and the WMD Terrorism Research Program. Each 
program supports the Center's mission by training graduate students, building 
a worldwide community of nonproliferation experts, publishing both on-line 
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and print resources on all aspects of WMD, providing background material to 
the media, and creating seminars and on-line tutorials to be used by high 
school and college instructors and the general public. In conjunction with the 
Masters in International Policy Studies Program of the Monterey Institute, 
CNS offers a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies and internship 
opportunities in international organizations that expand the career possibilities 
and interests of Institute students. The center’s address information is 460 
Pierce Street, Monterey, CA 93940, USA, Telephone: (831) 647-4154; Fax: 
(831) 647-3519 E-mail: cns@miis.edu; and Web: http://cns.miis.edu. 
 
9. Seminars and Programs 
 
 Since the export controls are highly regulated by the administrative 
agency and the regulations are very complex, a novice who wants to gain a 
general background in export controls, should: 1) attend the Export 
Administration Seminars and Workshops explaining the Regulations offered 
by the Bureau of Industry and Security and its Regional Offices; 2) start with 
some popular works in this area. The major seminars and educational 
programs are listed as follows. 
9.1 Coping with U.S. Export Controls Program 
 
 Practicing Law Institute has organized this annual program since 
1984. It is usually held in Washington, D.C. This in-depth educational 
program is presented by experts including the BIS’s officers and export 
control practitioners. To obtain the program schedule, contact the Practicing 
Law Institute (810 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10019, Phone: (800) 
260-4PLI, Fax: (800) 321-0093), website: http://www.pli.edu/. Practicing 
Law Institute has also published the course handbooks for this program since 
1984. The articles of the handbooks are available on Westlaw. 
9.2 Export Control of Equipment, Technology and Services 
 
 The Federal Publications Seminars, a Thomson West business, is a 
leading provider of practical courses and materials for contract 
professionals. It also offers the seminar of Export Control of Equipment, 
Technology and Services twice a year in Washington DC and Las Vegas. The 
focus of this seminar is on practical solutions to the complex problems and 
procedures involved in export licensing. The seminar covers: 
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• The legal framework- Statutes and regulations; their magnitude, 
requirements and daily impact. 
• Preparation-What to do up front to prevent violations of the export 
regulations and resultant penalties. 
• Licensing procedures-A step-by-step guide for obtaining export 
licenses; understanding the agencies that administer the regulations; 
what questions to ask and when. 
• License denials-How to appeal successfully. 
• Enforcement procedures-Prosecution and available defenses. 
• Special problems-Proliferation controls; technical data; computer 
hardware/software; proposals; foreign trade shows; restricted countries; 
emergency situations; plant visits by non-U.S. nationals; joint ventures.  
 
 The seminar offers 9.9 CLE and 9.0 CPE hours for participants and 
charges $895 fees per person. For more information, please check its website 
out at http://www.fedpubseminars.com/seminar/ eciic.html. 
9.3 Society for International Affairs, Inc. (SIA) 
 
 The Society for International Affairs, Inc. is a voluntary, non-profit, 
educational organization that was jointly formed in 1967 by U.S. Government 
and manufacturers. Its mission is to educate the international trade community 
on all aspects of technology transfer by providing a forum for the exchange of 
information on the export and import process. The SIA interests cover the 
entire spectrum of licensing issues pertaining to the Department of 
Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury. The SIA holds conferences and 
training seminars on export control law compliance several times each year. 
For the information about these conferences and seminars, check the website 
of the SIA at http://www.siaed.org/. It also publishes a quarterly newsletter 
called the SIA Newsletter. Some of the back issues can be viewed at its 
website (http://www.siaed.org/en/ cms/?15).  
 
9.4 Law School Course: U.S. Export Control Law and Regulation  
 
 Professor Calabrese at George Washington School of Law offers this 
course, in which the students will study U.S. laws and regulations that govern 
the export of defense products and dual-use civilian technologies and examine 
international export control treaties and case studies. The students will also 
participate in team exercises involving export transactions.  
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9.5 BIS Export Control Seminar Programs 
 
 The Exporter Counseling Division of the BXA, the former title of 
BIS, used to offer a one-day introductory export administration seminar every 
two weeks in Washington D.C. and a few major cities in the U.S. Today, the 
BIS offers more of export control seminars. Such seminars are not only 
offered in Washington D.C. but in almost all major cities in the U.S. These 
seminar programs are listed as follows: 
 
 Complying with U.S. Export Controls: This two-day program 
provides an in-depth examination of the Export Administration Regulations. 
The program will cover the information exporters need to know to comply 
with U.S. export control requirements on commercial goods by focusing on 
what items and activities are subject to the EAR; steps to take to determine 
the export licensing requirements for your item; how to determine the Export 
Control Classification Number (ECCN); when you can export or re-export 
without applying for a license; export clearance procedures and record 
keeping requirements; Export Management System (EMS) concepts; and real 
life examples in applying this information. 
 
 Intermediate Deemed Export: This half-day program is for 
exporters who have basic knowledge of the EAR and have a solid 
understanding of how to apply the regulations and to classify technology 
properly. This highly intensive program will integrate practical exercises and 
presentations about the appropriate sequence of analysis in assessing deemed 
export licensing requirements.  
 
 Essentials of Export Controls: This is an intensive, one-day 
program that covers the key information on how to comply with the EAR the 
major elements of the U.S. export control system for commercial exports.  
 
 Technology Controls: This full-day program will offer a 
comprehensive look at how to comply with the U.S. export and re-export 
controls relating to technology, software, and encryption, including what is 
considered an export or re-export of technology or software; what technology 
and software is subject to the EAR; how to determine the ECCN; what license 
exceptions are available; and the unique application requirements of 
technology and software. BIS technical and policy specialists will also discuss 
important export control issues that may arise in the employment of foreign 
nationals and for foreign items incorporating, or produced from, controlled 
U.S.-origin software and technology. The afternoon will focus on the latest 
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developments in encryption controls and the unique provisions related to 
encryption under the EAR. 
 
 How to Classify Your Item: This half-day workshop will provide a 
detailed look at the step-by-step process for determining the appropriate 
ECCN to avoid pitfalls that may lead to inaccurate classifications. This hands-
on workshop is ideal for those with technical backgrounds. 
 
 How To Develop an Export Management and Compliance 
Program: This program provides participants who have a basic knowledge of 
export controls with information on how to develop an Export Management 
and Compliance Program (EMCP), which is a written set of company 
guidelines and institutionalized procedures to be used to ensure employees 
know their export control responsibilities, that the right procedures are being 
followed, and that the right questions are being asked to safeguard against 
exports being made that are contrary to the EAR and U.S. national security 
interests. 
 
 Export Compliance for Forwarders: These full-day and half-day 
workshops are ideal for freight forwarders, carriers, and others in the 
transportation industry who need to learn their responsibilities under the EAR 
and the Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations. Regulatory specialists from BIS 
will review the major elements of the U.S. export control system for 
commercial/dual use exports and provide you with information on your 
responsibilities and liabilities in export transactions.  
 
 Exploring the EAR: This half-day program has been specially 
designed for exporters who have had at least three years of commerce export 
licensing experience and would like to further their knowledge and usage of 
the EAR. The program will look at the regulations through the practical 
approach of case studies and show how to find and appropriately use those 
sections of the EAR that apply to export transactions.  
 
 Intermediate License Exceptions: This program is designed for 
exporters who have at least one year of commerce export licensing 
experience. The program is intended to enhance participants’ understanding 
of the terms, provisions, applicability, and use of all License Exceptions in 
Part 740 of the EAR. Specific topics covered will include recent changes to 
License Exceptions provisions; the restrictions that govern the use of all 
License Exceptions; the distinction between list based and transaction based 
License Exceptions; and the use of Country Groups designations in 
determining license exception eligibility.  
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 The detail descriptions and schedule for these seminars and 
workshops are available at BIS website at http://www.bis.doc.gov/. Time to 
time, the BIS also works with foreign governments to hold such seminars in 
foreign countries to educate local business communities about U.S. and the 
hosting countries’ export controls, regulations and enforcement. For example, 
the BIS and the Ministry of Commerce of China co-hosted two such seminars 
in China respectively in 2000 and 2003. 
9.6 Automated Services of the Bureau of Industry and Security 
(1) The Simplified Network Application Process (SNAP) 
 
 SNAP is a Web-based system that enables exporters to submit export 
and re-export license applications, high performance computer notices, and 
commodity classification requests directly to BIS via the Internet in a secure 
environment. The URL is http://www.bis.doc.gov/snap/index.htm. 
(2) Telephone Access/Voice Information Services 
 
 This is an automated telephone service provided by Exporter 
Counseling Division of the BIS to answer the most frequently asked 
questions. This service can be reached from a touch tone telephone in 
Washington D.C. at (202) 482-4811, or either one of the Regional Offices of 
the BIS in California at (949) 660-0144 or (408) 998-7402. The range of 
recorded information includes: information on obtaining Commodity 
Classifications; emergency handling procedures; forms or publications; 
regulations updates; seminar program information; and facsimile machine 
telephone numbers. 
(3) The System for Tracking Export License Applications (STELA)  
 
 STELA is the BXA digitized voice answering service which provides 
exporters with timely information on the status of their applications for export 
license. To reach STELA, use a touch tone phone to call (202) 482-2752.59 
 
PART TWO: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONS 
 
 To prevent the countries that are hostile to the United States or 
potential adversaries from possessing due-use technologies, weapons of mass 
                                                 
59 See also http://www.bis.doc.gov/Licensing/STELA4U.htm (last visited Oct. 
30, 2007).  
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destruction, and missile technologies from other industrialized countries, the 
United States, after the World War II, has worked with its allies to create 
several international regimes to control the transfer of these technologies and 
weapons. Furthermore, to reduce the arm race and prevent WMD 
technologies from being proliferated, the United States also negotiated with 
the former Soviet Union and other nuclear-power countries to enter several 
international treaties. The major international treaties and export control and 
nonproliferation organizations are discussed as follows. In addition to these 
inter-governmental efforts and diplomacies, some international non-
governmental organizations have made tremendous efforts to stop WMD 
proliferation. Most of the following information was gathered by searching 
the Internet and compiled from the websites listed below. 
1.  International Treaties 
 
 Between 1950s and 1990s, several multinational treaties to prevent 
the use and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and related 
technologies were negotiated and reached and has been opened for states to 
join. These treaties have become the core source of international law on the 
export control and nonproliferation of WMD. 
1.1 IAEA and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)  
 
 In December 1953, U.S. President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for 
Peace” proposal, presented to the eighth session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, and urged that an international organization be established 
to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while guarding against 
development of weapons capabilities in additional countries.60 Based on the 
proposal, in 1957, the UN established the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) within the UN family and authorized IAEA with the dual 
responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear technology.61 The main 
mission of IAEA is to promote the safeguard and verification of nuclear 
materials and activities. The IAEA Statute was created to guide its missions 
and work. For more information about IAEA and the full-text of the IAEA 
Statute can be accessed at its website at http://www.iaea.org.  
 
 Within the framework of the UN, a treaty on nuclear non-proliferation 
was addressed and negotiated between 1957 and 1968. By 1968 final 
                                                 
60 David Fisher, the First Forty Years: History of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency 10 (1997). 
61 Id. at 143. 
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agreement had been reached on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which enable the international cooperation for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy and further the goal of achieving nuclear 
disarmament. By 1970, the treaty became effective and open for signature. 
Currently, there are 187 countries joined the treaty and the NPT one of the 
most popular international treaties. The Treaty establishes a safeguard system 
under the responsibility of IAEA. The NPT requires its nuclear-weapon states 
not to transfer their nuclear weapons and technologies to any other states and 
its non-nuclear-weapon state parties to put in place safeguards on all their 
nuclear activities.62 The NPT also authorizes IAEA to verify that NPT parties 
are complying with their safeguards obligations.63 These safeguards include 
international inspections that help deter the use of nuclear material for nuclear 
explosive purposes.  
1.2 IAEA Additional Protocol 
 
 After the secret nuclear weapons programs of Iraq and North Korea 
were exposed, the IAEA began an effort in 1993 to better constrain NPT 
member-states' ability to illicitly pursue nuclear weapons. In 1997, the effort 
resulted in the Model Protocol Additions to the Agreement(s) between 
State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards,64 designed to 
strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards for verifying that non-
nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT only use nuclear materials and 
facilities for peaceful purposes. The protocol asks the party nations of the 
NPT to voluntarily ratify the protocol. For the ratification status of the 
protocol, check out this website: 
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/ sg_protocol.html. 
1.3 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
 
 On April 10, 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was reached and opened for 
signature. This convention supplements the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 
Biological Weapons Convention, the first multilateral disarmament treaty 
                                                 
62 Articles I and II of the NPT. The full-text of the NPT is available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/ Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
63 Article III of the NPT. 
64 The full-text of the protocol is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ -
Documents/Infcircs/1998/ infcirc540corrected.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
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banning the production and use of an entire category of weapons. The BTWC 
entered into force on March 26, 1975. Under its provisions, parties are 
obligated not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological weapons or 
agents or toxins of types or quantities that have no peaceful or protective 
purposes. As of February 2006, the BTWC had 145 states parties and 18 
signatories. However, the absence of any formal verification regime to 
monitor compliance has limited the effectiveness of the Convention. To 
mitigate this shortcoming, Article XII of the BTWC stipulates that a 
Conference should be held for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the 
Convention and to ensure that its provisions and purposes are being upheld. 
The Review Conferences convene in Geneva, Switzerland, at the request and 
support of a majority of states parties. Under Article XII, the first such 
Conference was to take place five years after the entry into force of the 
Convention. The most recent conference (the Fifth Review Conference) was 
held on December 7, 2001 and November 11–22, 2002. 
 
 In 2003, the Canadian government created the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention website, at http://www.opbw.org, to strengthen the 
awareness and compliance of the BTWC. Currently, this website is 
maintained by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford. 
This website provides comprehensive, objective, and up-to-date information 
about the BTWC. It includes the Convention, the status of signatory and 
reservations made by the Party States, the Final Declarations of the successive 
Review Conferences together with other documentation for the Review 
Conferences as well as information on the ongoing efforts to strengthen the 
regime. This website event lists some domestic laws of the Party States 
related to export control and criminal penalties on biological weapon. 
1.4 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
 
 In 1992, after a decade of long negotiations within a multilateral 
framework, the Conference on Disarmament under the United Nations agreed 
to the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which was then 
adopted by the UN General Assembly at its forty-seventh session, on 
November 30, 1992, in its resolution entitled Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on Their Destruction. As of February 2006, there were 175 party states to the 
Convention, including the United States. The Convention prohibits all 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use of 
chemical weapons. It requires each state party to destroy chemical weapons 
and chemical weapons production facilities it possesses, as well as any 
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chemical weapons it may have abandoned on the territory of another state 
party.  
 
 The CWC does not prohibit production, processing, consumption, or 
trade of related chemicals for peaceful purposes, but it does establish a 
verification regime to ensure such activities are consistent with the object and 
purpose of the treaty. The verification provisions of the CWC not only affect 
the military sector but also the civilian chemical industry, world-wide, 
through certain restrictions and obligations regarding the production, 
processing and consumption of chemicals that are considered relevant to 
chemical weapons defined by the Convention. They will be verified through a 
combination of reporting requirements, routine on-site inspections of declared 
sites and short-notice challenge inspections. The Convention also contains 
provisions on assistance in case a state party is attacked or threatened with 
attack by chemical weapons and on promoting the trade in chemicals and 
related equipment among States Parties. 
 
 To help American businesses to comply with the Convention, the 
Bureau of Industry and Security under the Commerce Department and the 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation under the State 
Department created and maintains a website at http://www.cwc.gov. This 
website includes the full-text of the CWC, relevant U.S. federal regulations, 
and the procedures for export declaration and inspection. 
2. Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes 
 
 Besides the above international treaties, the international community 
also established the following organizations to coordinate nonproliferation 
efforts. However, there is no enforcement mechanism within the regimes. The 
member nations are voluntary to adhere to the nonproliferation guidelines 
created by these regimes based on their national export control laws.  
2.1 CoCom and Wassenaar Arrangement 
 
 In 1949, the United States and its Western allies created the 
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) as a 
mechanism to coordinate (1) allied export control policies, (2) the lists of 
controlled items, and (3) the enforcement of the controls, in order to restrict 
Western trade with the Soviet Union and its communist allies (later the 
Warsaw Pact countries). Its members are the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) nations except Iceland but including Japan and 
Australia. CoCom was based in Paris. Actually, CoCom was not an 
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international organization, but a coordinating mechanism. There was no 
international treaty or other agreement having been reached to govern 
CoCom. Measures agreed to among the members of CoCom would not have 
legal effect until the participating governments pass laws or regulations to 
implement them.65  
 
 The Warsaw Pact lasted throughout the Cold War until 1991, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the other communist states in 
Europe. Due to the end of the Cold War and economic interests, the Western 
European countries wanted to change the international export control policy 
and increase their trades with the Eastern European countries and China. In 
November 1993, at a meeting in Hague, the Netherlands, the CoCom 
members agreed to dismantle CoCom by March 31, 1994, and to replace it 
with a new export control regime. The new control regime would focus on 
arms, arms-related exports and on nuclear and missile non-proliferation, 
particularly to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.66 On July 12, 1996 after 
five rounds of negotiations among the former members of CoCom in 
Wassenaar, a Dutch town near Hague, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Control for Conventional Arms and dual-use Goods and Technologies (WA) 
was established to success CoCom.67 Today, there are forty member states for 
the WA. Most of them are European countries including Russia and most of 
the other former communist Eastern European countries. Japan and South 
Korea are also members of the WA. For more information about the WA, 
check out its website at http://www.wassenaar.org. 
 
 Although the purpose of WA is to contribute to regional and 
international security and stability, its function has been reduced from the 
export control coordination of the CoCom to merely the promotion of 
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and 
dual-use goods and technologies. In addition, the decision to transfer or deny 
transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State 
according to its national legislation and policies. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of WA as an international export control regime is quite minimal today. 
                                                 
65 Cecil Hunt, CoCom and Other International Cooperation in Export Control, in 
Coping With U.S. Export Controls 1993, 295, 303-4 (New York, N.Y. : Practicing 
Law Institute, 1993). 
66 U.S., Allies Still at Odds Over Substance of New Post - COCOM Regime, 
Official Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 175 (Feb. 2, 1994); Export Controls: U.S., 
COCOM Allies Agree to New Easing of Export Curbs on High-Speed Computers, 11 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 63 (Jan. 12, 1994). 
67 Michael Lipson, the Reincarnation of CoCom Explaining Post-Cold War 
Export Controls, the Nonproliferation Review 33 (Winter 1999).  
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2.2 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
 
 The MTCR is an informal multilateral organization established in 
1987 without a treaty but a political understanding among the participating 
countries to seek controls on the spread of goods and technologies that relate 
to the production or use of missiles, which can be used to deliver WMD. 
Currently, there are 33 participating countries, including most of European 
countries, Russia, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, South Africa, South 
Korea, and the United States. Its website is at http://www.mtcr.info/english/. 
 
 The Regime created and maintains the MTCR Guidelines and the 
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex. The Guidelines define the 
purpose of the MTCR and provide the overall structure and rules to guide the 
member countries and those adhering unilaterally to the Guidelines. The 
Equipment, Software and Technology Annex is designed to assist in 
implementing export controls on MTCR Annex items, which include a broad 
range of equipment and technology, both military and dual-use, which are 
relevant to missile development, production, and operation. Partner countries 
exercise restraint in the consideration of all transfers of items contained in the 
Annex. All such transfers are considered on a case by case basis by the 
participating countries. 
2.3 Australia Group 
 
 The Australia Group (AG) was formed in Sydney, Australia in 1985, 
following international concerns about the use of chemical weapons during 
the Iran-Iraq War to work against the proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapons. In its December 1992 meeting, the members agreed to impose 
export controls on a common list of biological organisms, toxins, and 
equipment.68 The Group meets annually to discuss ways of increasing the 
effectiveness of participating countries’ national export licensing measures to 
prevent would-be proliferators from obtaining materials for chemical and 
biological weapons programs. Participants in the Australia Group do not 
undertake any legally binding obligations: the effectiveness of their 
cooperation depends solely on a shared commitment to chemical and 
biological weapons non-proliferation goals and the strength of their respective 
national measures. Similar to the MTCR, the AG also created and maintains a 
nonproliferation guideline and control list for its members to follow. The 
                                                 
68 Export Controls: Clinton Sends Congress Report on Chemical Weapons 
Convention, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1403 (Aug. 25, 1993). 
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guideline and control list can be obtained from its website is at 
http://www.australiagroup.net/. 
  
 Currently the group consists of forty countries. Most of the 
participating countries are European countries but Russia does not participate. 
The other countries include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, South 
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, and the United States. The United States 
strongly encourages all countries to adopt national export controls consistent 
with the AG standards. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11th and 
the subsequent anthrax bioterrorism in the United States, the U.S. has been 
working to strengthen the AG to address better chemical and biological 
weapon proliferation and terrorism.  
2.4 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
 
 The NPT of 1968 granted non-nuclear-weapon states access to 
nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes as long as they 
committed not to develop nuclear weapons. However, in 1974, India 
conducted an initial nuclear explosion to test its nuclear bomb development 
capability. The test alerted the NPT nuclear supplier states that nuclear 
technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused so they 
established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to restrict the exports 
of certain equipment and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear 
weapons by providing a series of guidelines to its member states. These 
guidelines can be found at the NSG’s website at 
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/. The NSG Guidelines are implemented 
by each Participating Government according to its national laws and practices 
by making the decisions on export controls of nuclear technologies and 
equipment. 
 
 Now the NSG has 44 nations and consists of all the nations of 
Australia Group and some of the Eastern European nations: Bulgaria, the 
former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Russia. China also joined the 
NSG in 2004. 
2.5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 
 The IAEA was founded in 1957 and currently consists of 114 member 
states. Its primary objectives are to ensure any assistance given by the agency 
is not used for military purposes, and to safeguard nuclear materials and 
equipment from proliferation. Under the current U.S. system of nuclear export 
controls, the nation receiving nuclear goods is required to accept the IAEA 
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safeguards on all of its peaceful nuclear activities. For more information 
IAEA, please see IAEA and Treaty on the NPT and IAEA Protocol discussed 
above.  
2.6 Zangger Committee 
 The Zangger Committee, named after its first Chairman Prof. Claude 
Zangger from Switzerland also known as the “NPT Exporters Committee”, 
was formed following the coming into force of the NPT, to serve as the 
“faithful interpreter” of its Article III, paragraph 2, to harmonize the 
interpretation of nuclear export control policies for NPT Parties. Article III.2 
of the Treaty is about “especially designed or prepared equipment or material 
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.” The 
Zangger Committee maintains a Trigger List (triggering safeguards as a 
condition of supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in 
identifying equipment and materials subject to export controls. 
 Today the Zangger Committee has 36 members including all the 
nuclear weapon States. Its Trigger List includes illustrative examples of 
equipment and materials judged to be within the understandings of the 
Committee. The Trigger List and the Zangger Committee's understandings are 
published by the IAEA in the INFCIRC/209 series. The Zangger Committee 
also published a series of publications on nuclear non-proliferation. These 
publications are available on its website at 
http://www.zanggercommittee.org/Zangger/ Publications/default.htm.  
3. EU Policy on Export Controls for Disarmament and Nonproliferation 
 
 Many EU member states possess WMD or technologies to make 
WMD. To prevent WMD and related technologies from going to undesired 
hands, the EU has established an export control system to set a uniform policy 
and coordinate its member states’ efforts on nonproliferation. In addition to 
control its member states’ exporting WMD and related goods, the EU also 
actively participated in some other international efforts to promote 
nonproliferation among the countries that are not EU members. 
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3.1 Policies 
 
 Non proliferation and disarmament, in particular when it comes to 
weapons of mass destruction has always been a subject of high sensitivity and 
political importance for the European Union as stated in the external relation 
website of the EU.69 The EU general policy towards non proliferation and 
disarmament is: to keep a global approach, which insists on the respect, 
development and effective implementation of international multilateral 
treaties and conventions to ban or to minimize the recourse to and 
development of WMD.70 In December 2003, the European Council adopted 
an EU strategy against WMD proliferation in December 2003.71 The EU 
believes a global approach renders the world safer, as long as verification 
mechanisms are in place, respected and applied effectively. In addition to the 
multilateral approach, the EU also takes some complementary protection or 
defensive measures like export controls to further reduce the risk of 
proliferation and use of WMD. The EU has developed the following specific 
approaches for its member states when handling non proliferation and 
disarmament of WMD issues.  
 
 During political dialogue with third countries, the issue is frequently 
raised and the EU standpoint, first discussed and agreed upon between the 
Member States, is recalled and explained. At EU level the proliferation risks 
are duly taken into account. The safeguards systems implemented within the 
EU, the commitments of the Member states in the different international non-
proliferation regimes (Australia group, Missile Technology Control Regime, 
Nuclear Supplier’s Group, Wassenaar, Zangger), and specific regulations, like 
the Council regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports of dual-use items and technology, are important contributions to the 
global non-proliferation regime. 
 
 Finally, assistance programs are designed and implemented, in 
particular with Russia and other Newly Independent States and North Korea, 
to reinforce non-proliferation or support the realization of disarmament 
projects. These programs are financed from different Community Budget 
sources and managed by the Commission.72 
                                                 
69 See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/npd/index.htm (last visited Oct. 
30, 2007). 
70 Id. 
71 The full-text of the strategy is available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/118532.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
72 Id.  
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3.2 Actions 
 
 In the frame of the EU Common Strategy in the Russian Federation, 
the EU Council launched a program on Non-proliferation and Disarmament in 
the Russian Federation in December 1999, in which the EU objective is to 
support the Russian Federation in its efforts towards arms control and 
disarmament.73 The program proposes the following actions:  
 
1. To cooperate with the Russian Federation in the latter’s pursuit of a 
safe, secure and environmentally sound dismantlement and /or re-
conversion of infrastructure and equipment linked to its WMD; 
2. To provide a legal and operational framework for an enhanced 
European Union role in cooperative risk reduction activities in the 
Russian Federation through project orientated cooperation; and 
3. To promote coordination as appropriate of programs and projects in 
this field at Community, Member State and international level.74 
3.3 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 
 
 In October 1994, the Agreed Framework between the United States 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was signed in order 
to avoid a nuclear non-proliferation crisis. Under the Agreed Framework, the 
DPRK agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear program, and in 
return, the United States agreed to finance and construct in the DPRK two 
light-water reactors and provide the DPRK with an alternative source of 
energy. To achieve these goals, Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) was established on March 9, 1995, when Japan, the 
Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States expressed their common 
desire to implement the key provisions of the Agreed Framework and signed 
the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization.75 KEDO provides for the financing, building, and 
supply of a reactor project and for the supply of interim energy supplies. The 
EU recognizes that KEDO is a major industrial project that constitutes a vital 
contribution to non-proliferation, stability and rapprochement on the Korean 
                                                 
73 The Council Joint Action of December 17, 1999 on Establishing a European 
Union Cooperation Program for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian 
Federation (the full-text of the join action is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/npd/cja99.pdf) (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
74 Id. Article 1.  
75 The full-text of the agreement is available at 
http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/EstablishmentKEDO.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).  
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Peninsula. The EU concluded an Accession Agreement to KEDO as an 
Executive Board member On September 19, 1997. Unfortunately, due to the 
continued and extended failure of the DPRK to perform the steps that were 
required in the KEDO-DPRK, the Executive Board of KEDO decided on May 
31, 2006 to terminate the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project. However, the 
KEDO will continue to exist, as necessary to settle financial and legal 
obligations stemming from the termination of the LWR project.76   
3.4. Dual Use Goods Export Controls 
 The EU understands that “dual-use” goods and technology 
developed for civilian uses can be used for military applications or to 
produce weapons so the EU recognizes the necessity of export controls 
(licensing) of these items. The EU requires all its member states to control 
export of these dual-use items. The European Court of Justice also 
established case law in the area of dual-use goods to legitimize the common 
commercial policy, as set out in Article 133 of the EC Treaty, which requires 
the EU member states to abide the export control rules when exporting dual-
use items to third countries.77 The EU member states also individually 
participate in a number of international non-proliferation regimes (the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the 
Australia Group), and in the Wassenaar Arrangement (except Cyprus).78  
 On June 22, 2000, the Council of EU adopted the new European Dual 
Use Regulation (n°1334/2000) setting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports of dual use items and technology, which was subsequently 
published in OJ L159 of 30.06.2000. The Regulation builds on the previous 
regime, but is now based completely on Article 133 of the EC Treaty, relating 
to Common Commercial Policy, which entered into force on September 28, 
2000.79 This EU regulation also harmonized the export control list of dual-use 
items, licensing requirements, and procedures for the export and transfer of 
dual-use items for all EU Member States. The member countries of the EU 
                                                 
76 See http://www.kedo.org/index.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
77 The ECJ delivered preliminary rulings in the case of “Werner” (Case C-
70/94) and “Leifer” (case C-83/94), see also 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/dualuse/legis/ index_ en.htm (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
78 See 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/dualuse/legis/index_en.htm (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2007).  
79 See http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/npd/index.htm (last visited Oct. 
30, 2007). 
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regularly send their export related questions to the meetings of the EU export 
control working groups for review. 
Besides the individual member state participating in the above stated 
international nonproliferation regimes, the EU Commission also involved 
itself with these regimes to reinforce the consistency and effectiveness of 
non proliferation export control measures. The Commission is a full 
member at the Australia Group, a permanent observer at the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, and participates in the EU 
Presidency Delegation in the Missile Technology Control Regime and in 
the Wassenaar Arrangement. 
4. UK Export Control Regime: the Export Control Organization 
 
 As a major nuclear power country that also holds a lot of advanced 
technologies that can be used to develop WMD and WMD delivery systems, 
the United Kingdom (UK) has cooperated with the United States very closely 
on export controls and also created a sophisticated export control system. 
Therefore, the UK export control system deserved a bit more discussions.   
4.1. Export Control Act 
 
 The current export control regime of UK is based on the UK’s Export 
Control Act of 2002. Under the Act, trading including trafficking and 
brokering between oversees countries of the following goods are subject to 
export controlled: 
 
• All goods contained within Schedule 1 of the Export of Goods, Transfer 
of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance; 
• Long range missiles and their component parts (range over 300 km);  
• Certain paramilitary good whose export the Government has already 
banned because of evidence of their use in torture; and  
• Goods on the UK Military List to any embargoed destination. 
 
 The structure of UK’s Export Control Act is very similar to the U.S. 
export control legislation. It created several export-controlled commodities 
lists called UK Strategic Export Control Lists which include UK National 
Military List, UK National Explosive-related List, UK National Dual-use List, 
UK National Human Right List (goods falling under the EU Human Rights 
list and goods that are used for capital punishment and torture), UK National 
Security and Paramilitary, and UK National Radioactive List. UK exporters 
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can check their export products against these lists to see if they need export 
licenses. The full-text of the Export Control Act of 2002 is available at 
ttp://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file8418.pdf or 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2002/20020028.htm. 
4.2. Export Control Administration 
 
 The administrative agency in charge is the Export Control 
Organisation (ECO), which is part of the Europe and World Trade Directorate 
(EWT) which, in turn, is part of the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) of the UK government.  The chief task of the 
ECO is to process applications for licences to export any of the strategic 
goods including dual use goods that can be used for both civilian and military 
purposes from the UK. Due to the complexity of the export control regime, 
the ECO also provides the following services to facilitate the export control 
licensing process: 
 
• Provides help for exporters, via a Helpline, a website, a DVD and 
video, and programs of seminars and workshops; 
• Enforces export control compliance with the terms of “open” licences 
through regular company visits; 
• Runs a Rating Service which advises exporters on whether or not a 
licence is required in a particular instance; 
• Records figures about licensing applications for the Government's 
annual report on strategic export controls, details of which are available 
on the Foreign Office website; 
• Takes part in the work of the international arms control regimes, 
updates the control lists, develops new “open general” licences and 
contributes to government export licensing policy; 
• Works with other government departments on counter-proliferation 
activities; and  
• Takes part in an international outreach programs to promote good 
export licensing practice in other countries, particularly those which 
have recently joined the European Union. 
 
 The contact information of the ECO is: Export Control Organisation, 
3rd Floor, Kingsgate House, 66-74 Victoria Street, London SW1E 6SW, e-
mail: eco.help@dti.gsi.gov.uk and the website: 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/index.html. 
486 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 35.3 
 
 
5. Russian Export Control Regime: the Center for Export Controls 
 
 The formal Soviet Union and its successor, Russian Federation, have 
had a very large stockpile of WMD and has been a major exporter of nuclear 
equipment and missiles and related technologies. In the era of the Soviet 
Union, the communist government had created an export control regime to 
regulate the export of its nuclear and other dual-use products and 
technologies. The Russian Federation inherited the export control system and 
restructured it later. Therefore, the Russian export control system is also 
deserved more attention. 
5.1 Export Control Legislation 
 After 1992, the newly-founded Russian Federation was able to 
quickly re-establish a new export control regime based on the old export 
control system existed in the Soviet Union. Since then, Russia has 
promulgated several legislations dealing with export controls. The most 
import statute is the Federal Law on Export Control promulgated on July 29, 
1999, which provides the legal foundation for the Russian export control 
system. It establishes the framework for the state's export control policy. The 
law defines what export control and controlled goods are, and specifies the 
responsibilities of government agencies and of firms exporting goods that are 
subject to control. The law authorizes the Russian President to define basic 
guidelines of Russia's export control policy, to coordinate between various 
governmental agencies responsible for conducting export control, and 
approves lists of controlled goods and technologies. The law authorizes the 
Russian Prime Minister to implement export control policy including 
compliance with international export control regimes, to determine procedures 
for conducting foreign trade in controlled items, and to negotiates and signs 
international export control agreements on behalf of the Russian Federation. 
The Prime Minister also coordinates policy, implements legislation, resolves 
interagency disputes, and makes recommendations for improving licensing 
procedures and other regulations. The law established the Export Control 
Commission, an interagency body, which is responsible for coordinating 
policy, implementing legislation, resolving interagency disputes, and making 
recommendations for improving licensing procedures and other regulations. 
The full-text English translation of this law is available at 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/excon/ exconlaw.htm and the 
full-text of this law in Russian can be found in the Russian Legislation 
Database at http://law.optima.ru.  
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5.2 Export Control Administrative Agency 
 The Russian export control law also created the Department of Export 
Control (DEK) under Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
(MEDT) as the administrative agency to issue all licenses for exports of 
controlled goods, provide organizational and informational support to the 
Export Control Commission, coordinate with development of regulations and 
implementation of interagency review process, and provide information 
support to exporters. On March 9, 2004, a Russian presidential decree was 
issued that transferred the responsibilities of the Department of Export 
Control of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade to a new 
Federal Service of Technical and Export Controls Service (FSTEC) to be 
established under the Ministry of Defense. Thus, the FSTEC became the 
major export control administrative agency in Russia. Its website is at 
http://www.fstec.ru/. 
5.3 Center for Export Controls 
 The Center for Export Controls (CEC) is a NGO with strong 
connection with Russian government on export controls. Its mission is 
providing information, training, and consulting in support of Russian 
exporters whose products and/or services constitute probable precursors for 
the creation of WMD. The CEC offers organization and implementation of 
training in export controls for dual-use product exporting industry, assistance 
in developing internal compliance programs, and preparation, evaluation, and 
issuance of licensing documentation and international contracts on dual-use 
commodity, service, and technology exports. The founders of the CEC are : 
Department for International Relations, the Ministry of Nuclear Energy of 
Russian Federation; M.V. Khrunichev Research and Manufacturing Space 
Center; M.V. Keldysh Research Center; Russian League of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs; League of Assistance to Defense Industry. The CEC’s 
activities are supported by the federal executive offices involved in the 
national export control system of the Russian Federation. In particular, the 
CEC maintains close working relationship with the following Russian Federal 
agencies: 
 
• Security Council (http://www.scrf.gov.ru/); 
• Department for Export Controls, Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade (http://www.economy.gov.ru/merit/dep_dek/index_dek.htm);  
• Department for Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(http://www.mid.ru);  
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• Export Control Division, Ministry of Defense (http://www.mil.ru);  
• RF Ministry of Nuclear Energy (http://www.minatom.ru/);  
• Russian Aerospace Agency (http://www.rosaviakosmos.ru/);  
• RF State Customs Committee (http://www.customs.ru/rus/index.xpml); 
• RF Committee for Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign States.  
 The CEC also maintains working contacts with the U.S. federal 
agencies and institutions and other foreign government agencies in charge of 
export controls. The contact information of the CEC is: Russia, 125438, 
Moscow, Onezhskaya, 8; Tel./fax: 7 (095) 456-23-36, e-mail: 
expcon@aha.ru; and website : 
http://www.expcon.ru/EnglishVer/Enindex.htm.  
6. Export Control Regimes of China, Germany, Japan, India, and Pakistan 
6.1 China, the People’s Republic of 
 
 The Second Office of the Export Control Section of the Department 
of Machinery, Electrical, and High Tech Production of the Ministry of 
Commerce is the major Chinese administrative agency in charge of export 
controls. Its website (in Chinese only) is at 
http://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/. The Chinese export control laws and 
regulations, controlled commodity lists, export licensing procedure can be 
found at this website. 
 
 The Department of Disarmament and Arm Controls of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is in charge of handling issues such as arms control, 
disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear export control, and global and 
regional security, to implement the general and specific policies in the above-
mentioned fields and to conduct diplomatic affairs related to the above-
mentioned fields. Its English website is at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjwt/cjjk/default.htm. 
6.2 Germany, the Federal Republic 
 
 The Federal Republic of Germany is a member of numerous 
international treaties and export control regimes aiming at the harmonization 
of export control regulations and licensing policies. As a member state of the 
EU, Germany also follows the export control regulations and the controlled 
item lists created by the EU. The Federal Office of Economics and Export 
Control (BAFA) under the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
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(BMWi), is responsible for the administrative implementation of the Federal 
Government's export control policy and the German central licensing 
authority working in close co-operation with other federal agencies on a 
complex export control system. The English website of the BAFA is at 
http://www.bafa.de/bafa/en/index.html. The export control and licensing 
information of Germany can be found at this website. 
6.3 Japan 
 
 The Trade and Industry Security Export Control Office of the 
Ministry of Economy is the main Japanese administrative agency in charge of 
export controls. Its website is at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/ 
anpo/index.html. The Japanese legislations and some government publications 
on export controls can be found at this website. 
 
 The Website of the Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation Department under the Ministry of Foreign Affair can be found at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/index.html. 
 
 The Center for Information on Security Export Control (CISTEC) is 
the only non-profit and non-governmental organization in Japan dealing with 
security export control issues comprehensively. CISTEC aims to contribute to 
world peace by supporting rational and effective security export control and 
by serving as a “linkage channel” among industry, government and academia 
on security export control. Its website is at 
http://www.cistec.or.jp/english/cistec/introE2. html#annaie1 
6.4 India and Pakistan  
 
 On 11 May 1998, India conducted three nuclear device tests. Two 
days later, two more tests were conducted. Several days later on May 28, 
1998, Pakistan followed suit by conducting five nuclear tests. After these 
tests, both countries publicly became nuclear weapon States. Before and after 
these nuclear bomb tests, both India and Pakistan had their own export control 
legislations and systems. Pakistan government released several export control 
regulations respectively in July 1998, February 1999, and August 1999, as 
well as the Export Policy and Procedures Order in November 2000. These 
regulations banned the export of fissile material and required a “no objection 
certificate” to be issued by the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 
for the export of nuclear substances, radioactive material, and nuclear energy-
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related equipment.80 When the controversy episode of A.Q. Khan, the 
Pakistan’s nuclear program architect, who secretly sold Pakistan nuclear 
technologies to Iran and Libya, surfaced, it revealed the weakness and 
loophole of the Pakistan export control system. 
 
 Under the pressures of the international community, especially under 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),81 to make sure India and 
Pakistan commit to non-proliferation,  Pakistan’s national statute entitled 
“Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment Related to 
Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004” 
entered into force on September 23, 2004 while India’s “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) 
Act, 2005” entered into force on June 6, 2005.82 The contents and structure of 
                                                 
80 Shi-chin Lin, The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani 
Export Controls (2004) (available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_54a.html) (last 
visited October 30, 2007)). For example, the older laws and administrative regulations 
related export controls in Pakistan include: 
Import and Export (Control) Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXIX of 1950). 
Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (PNSRP) Ordinance, 1984 and 
PNSRP Regulation,1990.   
Statutory Notification No. SRO-782 (1)/1998 prohibits export of fissionable 
materials. 
Statutory Notification No.SRO-23 (1)/1999 prohibits the export of Anti-
Personnel Landmines. 
Statutory Notification No.SRO-124 (1)/1999 requires a No Objection 
Certificate from the Defense Ministry for export of arms, ammunitions, explosives 
and ingredients. 
Statutory Notification No.SRO-482 (1)/2000 and SRO 111 (1)/2004. Issued by 
the Ministry of Commerce lays down the Export Policy Procedures. 
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Ordinance, 2000 (Ordinance No. 
LIV of 2000). This law regulates and controls the import and export of chemicals in 
acordance with the provisions of CWC and provides for criminal penalties in case of 
violations. 
Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2001. Ordinance. Under this 
Ordinance, PNRA issues the required no objection certificate for import and export of 
any radioactive materials or radiation sources 
81 Resolution 1540 calls upon all states to implement stringent export control 
laws on the transfer, shipment, re-transfer and trans-shipment of materials or 
technology that may be used in the development, manufacture, and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
82 The text of India and Pakistan's export control laws can respectively be found 
at http://meaindia.nic.in/disarmament/ 07da01.pdf and 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc636.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2007). 
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the Pakistan’s and India’s export control legislation are very similar. Both 
legislations provide broad jurisdiction and authority of the central 
governments over their citizens at home and abroad and foreign nationals in 
their territories involving dual-use goods exports and impose criminal and 
civil penalties on violators. These two legislations also established the 
relevant export licensing and oversight authorities, as well as provisions for 
necessary delegation of authority to officials.83 
 
 The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) under the Ministry 
of Commerce is the Indian official export control agency. Its website 
(http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/) does not have obvious links to Indian government’s 
export control policy or licensing procedures. However, if you run “export 
control” search at its website, the documents related to export controls would 
be emerged. From the website of the DGFT, it can be seen that the DGFT’s 
main role is to promote Indian foreign trade, especially exporting Indian 
products. The trade promotion role is kind of contradictory to the function of 
export controls of dual-use products and technologies. 
 
 Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority is entrusted by its government 
with the responsibility to ensure the physical protection measures for the 
safety and security of nuclear material and radioactive sources. According to 
the Export Policy Order, 2007 (SRO 1021(I)/2007) issued by the Pakistan 
Ministry of Commerce, the export control license of dual-use goods is 
administered by the Ministry of Commerce.84  
7. Research Institutes and Advocatory Organizations 
 
 Besides the Center for International Trade and Security at the 
University of Georgia and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies mentioned 
above in Part One, the following institutes and organizations also engage in 
research on the issues related export control and nonproliferation of WMD. 
Some of the following organizations are dedicated to promote the ban of 
using and trading WMD and related goods and technologies. 
                                                 
83 Ziad Haider & Souvik Saha, ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN’S EXPORT 
CONTROL LAWS (available at http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA20050-
713866) (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). 
84 The Export Policy Order, 2007 (SRO 1021(I)/2007) can be found at 
http://www.commerce.gov.pk/SROs/1021- 08102007-EPO.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2007). 
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7.1 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control 
 
 The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control was established in 
1986 as a nonprofit research organization that operates in Washington, DC 
and under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin. The Project is funded 
by several private foundations. Its mission is to slow the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction. The Project has been investigating sales of proliferation-
related technology for twenty years and has identified thousands of buyers 
linked to mass destruction weapon and missile proliferation. This organization 
publishes various publications on nuclear arms control and export controls of 
dual-use goods. The most important one is the RISK REPORT, a searchable 
database in CD-ROM format, which provides the latest unclassified 
intelligence on weapons of mass destruction programs worldwide and is 
updated every three weeks. The suspect buyers listed in this database are built 
by experts using the reliable sources available: government reports, 
manufacturers' brochures, industry databases, trade journals, and credible 
media reports. Some of its publications including research papers and 
testimonies before the U.S. Congress are freely available on its website at 
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/. 
7.2 National Academies of Sciences (NAS)  
 
 The NAS has been studying U.S. export control policies since 1982 
with the support of the U.S. government. In 1987, the NAS published its first 
comprehensive report on export controls which is entitled Balancing the 
National Interest: U.S. National Security Export Controls and Global 
Economic Competition (Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1987).  
 
 Particularly, the NAS was requested by the Congress in the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 “to conduct a comprehensive study of 
the adequacy of the current export administration system in safeguarding 
United States' national security while maintaining United States international 
competitiveness and Western technological preeminence.”85 The Academies 
formed a special panel called the “Panel on the Future Design and 
Implementation of U.S. National Security Export Controls.” In December 
1990, the panel concluded a report which is entitled Finding Common 
Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment 
(Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1991). Besides the technology 
                                                 
85 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404 Historical Note (West 1991) (Study on National 
Security Export Controls). 
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export control issues, the Academies also conducts the researches and 
programs on nonproliferation of WMD and issues related to international 
terrorism. Some of its research reports can be ordered from its website at 
http://international.nationalacademies.org/gateway/international/conflict.html.  
7.3 Federation of American Scientists 
 
 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was formed in 1945 by 
atomic scientists from the Manhattan Project and is endorsed by dozens of 
Nobel Laureates in biology, chemistry, economics, medicine and physics as 
sponsors, the Federation has addressed a broad spectrum of national security 
issues related to nuclear technologies and carried out its mission to promote 
humanitarian uses of science and technology. Today, the Federation’s 
research and education projects include nuclear arms control and global 
security, conventional arms transfers, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, information technology for human health, and government 
information policy. For more information about the Federation, check out its 
website at http://www.fas.org/main/ home.jsp. 
 
 Since 1991, the FAS has maintained the Arms Sales Monitoring 
Project (ASMP) for the transparency, accountability, and restraint in U.S. 
arms exports; promoted the elimination of taxpayer subsidies for weapons 
exports and the broadening the coalition of citizens working to reform arms 
export policy; and increased the level of pressure on policy makers to act for 
the public interest rather than the special interests of arms manufactures. For 
additional information about the ASMP, check out its website at 
http://fas.org/asmp/. 
7.4 Nuclear Threat Initiative 
 
 The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) was founded in January 2001 by 
CNN founder Ted Turner and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn as a public 
charity organization. NTI's mission is to strengthen global security by 
reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons. NTI seeks to raise public awareness, serve as a catalyst for 
new thinking and take direct action to reduce these threats. In addition to Mr. 
Turner and Senator Nunn, NTI is guided by an experienced and international 
Board of Directors who share a common goal of taking action to reduce the 
gap between the global threats and the global response. NTI actively engaged 
in developing, shaping, and implementing the projects that the NTI supports 
financially. In addition to building global awareness, NTI is engaged in model 
programs to inspire private and governmental efforts toward threat reduction. 
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NTI created its website at http://www.nti.org/ index.html to give people 
access to some facts about nuclear threats. 
7.5 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)  
 
 Institute for Science and International Security is a non-government 
organization, which is established for informing the public about science and 
policy issues affecting international security. The ISIS has published 
“Preventing Illegal Exports: Learning from Case Studies” and “Key Elements 
of an Effective Export Control System” on its website at 
http://www.exportcontrols.org/ index.html to assist those who want to 
“develop and foster an export-control culture.” The contact information of the 
ISIS) is 236 Massachusetts Ave NE, Suite 500, Washington, D.C. 20002 
(202) 547-3633 fax: (202) 547-3634, e-mail: isis@isis-online.org. 
 
7.6 Stimson Center  
 
 Founded in 1989, the Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security 
through a unique combination of rigorous analysis and outreach. It offers 
some practical solutions to problems of national and international security. Its 
endeavors include a section on export controls that provides news and 
information as well as links to the Internet’s preeminent U.S. government and 
non-governmental sites in support of export control and related issues at its 
website (http://www.stimson.org/exportcontrol/). 1111 19th Street, NW, Suite 
1200, Washington, DC 20036, 202-223-5956, info@stimson.org, 
http://www.stimson.org. 
7.7 Council for a Livable World 
 
 The Council for a Livable World was founded in 1962 by eminent 
nuclear physicist Leo Szilard and other scientists who worked in the pioneer 
days of atomic weapons. The mission of the council is to warn the public and 
Congress of the threat of nuclear war and lead the way to rational arms 
control and nuclear disarmament. It provides senators with sophisticated 
technical and scientific information that helps them make intelligent decisions 
about nuclear arms control, strategic and conventional weapons, the military 
budget and United Nations peacekeeping. In 1980, the Council created the 
Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation to support its mission by 
providing outreach to policy-makers, opinion-shapers and voters. The contact 
information of the council is: 322 4th Street, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002; 
Phone: 202 543 4100, website: http://www.clw.org/.  
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7.8 Center for Defense Information (CDI) 
 
 The Center for Defense Information is dedicated to strengthening 
security through international cooperation, reducing reliance on unilateral 
military power to resolve conflict, reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, 
transforming and reforming military establishment, and monitoring spending 
on defense programs. The CDI seeks to contribute alternative views on 
security to promote wide-ranging discourse and debate.  The CDI educates the 
public and informs policy-makers about issues of security policy, strategy, 
operations, weapon systems and defense budgeting, and pursues creative 
solutions to the problems of today and tomorrow. The CDI is part of the 
World Security Institute (http://www.worldsecurityinstitute.org/), whose 
divisions include the Center for Defense Information, International Media, the 
Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, Azimuth Media, and International 
Programs with offices in Brussels and Moscow, and projects in China. The 
contact information of the center is: 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. 
Washington DC 20036-2109; phone: 202 332 6600; fax: 202 462 4559; e-
mail: info@cdi.org; website: http://www.cdi.org. 
7.9 Middle Powers Initiative  
 
 The Middle Powers Initiative is a program of the Global Security 
Institute. Its mission is to build bridges between governments to support the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Its campaign is guided by an International 
Steering Committee, chaired by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., former 
Canadian Disarmament Ambassador. Through the Middle Powers Initiative, 
the following eight international non-governmental organizations are able to 
work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate 
the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce 
nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
The Initiative also publishes a series of briefs on the issue of 
nonproliferation.86  
 
 
                                                 
86 These publications are freely available at its website 
(http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs.html). Its contact information is: 675 Third 
Avenue, Suite 315, New York, NY 10017, Tel: 1-646-289-5170, Fax: 1-646-289-
5171, Email: mpi@gsinstitute.org, and website at http://www.middlepowers.org/. 
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7.10 Global Security Institute  
 
 The Global Security Institute (GSI) was founded by the United States 
former Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000) from California, whose insight 
that nuclear weapons are impractical, unacceptably risky, and unworthy of 
civilization continues to inspire GSI's efforts to contribute to a safer world. 
GSI is dedicated to strengthening international cooperation and security based 
on the rule of law with a particular focus on nuclear arms control, non-
proliferation and disarmament. GSI has developed an exceptional team that 
includes former heads of state and government, distinguished diplomats, 
effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders, Nobel Peace 
Laureates, disarmament and legal experts, and concerned citizens. The Global 
Security Institute works through the following four results oriented programs. 
 
1. Bipartisan Security Group: Members of Congress and their staff, 
2. Disarmament & Peace Education: Citizens and leaders in the global 
community,  
3. Middle Powers Initiative: Heads of Government, diplomats and other 
officials around the world, and  
4. Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament: Legislators around 
the world.  
 
 The briefs and reports produced by the GSI can be retrieved from its 
website is at http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs.html. 
7.11 International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms 
 
 International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms 
(IALANA) is an international association of lawyers working for the 
elimination of nuclear arms, the strengthening of international law and the 
development of effective mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. IALANA was founded in 1988 in Stockholm and has 
grown into a fully-fledged international citizens' organization with 
consultative status with the United Nations. IALANA has also expanded its 
scope of action to include the following initiatives: 
 
• Efforts to abolish all types of inhumane weapons and to control the 
international arms trade; 
• Advancing concepts of security based on the application of law and 
legal mechanisms; 
• Development of non-offensive defense and implementation of 
confidence building measures; and 
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• Encouraging the establishment and use of the International Criminal 
Court and other legal procedures to address crimes against international 
humanitarian law.  
 
 IALANA has four international offices: Marburg, Germany 
(European Office), Wellington, Aotearoa/New Zealand (Pacific Office), New 
York (United Nations Office), and Colombo, Sri Lanka (South Asia Office). 
IALANA has affiliates all over the world including United States, Canada, 
Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, India, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, the 
Russian Federation, Norway and Italy. Its website is at http://www.ialana.net. 
7.12 International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global 
Responsibility  
 
 An International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global 
Responsibility (INES) was founded in Berlin on November 29, 1991. The 
primary aim of the Network is to encourage and facilitate international 
communication among scientists and engineers seeking to promote 
international peace and security, justice and sustainable development and 
working for a responsible use of science and technology; and to work for the 
reduction of military spending and for the transfer of resources thus liberated 
to the satisfaction of basic needs. The some publications produced by the 
INES can be found at its website at http://www.inesglobal.com. 
7.13 International Peace Bureau  
 
 The International Peace Bureau (IPB) is dedicated to the vision of a 
World Without War. Over the years thirteen of IPB officers have been 
recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. Their 265 member organizations in over 
sixty countries, and individual members, from a global network, bring 
together expertise and campaigning experience in a common cause. Their 
current main program centers on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable 
Development. The head quarter of the IPB is located at 41, Rue de Zurich; 
CH-1201 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel:  41 (22) 731 64 29; Fax:  41 (22) 738 94 
19, and Website:  http://www.ipb.org. 
7.14 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
 
 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) 
is the only international medical organization dedicated to preventing nuclear 
war and abolishing nuclear weapons. They recognize that the catastrophic 
health and environmental consequences of a nuclear war are at the extreme 
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end of a continuum of armed violence that undermines health and security. 
IPPNW's programs and campaigns include: International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, An International Campaign to Prevent Small Arms 
Violence, and Medical Student Leadership Development.  
 
 IPPNW is a non-partisan federation of national medical organizations 
in sixty countries, representing tens of thousands of doctors, medical students, 
other health workers, and concerned citizens who share the common goal of 
creating a more peaceful and secure world freed from the threat of nuclear 
annihilation. IPPNW Central Office is located at 727 Massachusetts Ave., 
Cambridge, MA 02139, Telephone: (617) 868-5050, Fax: (617) 868-2560, 
and its website is at http://www.ippnw.org. 
7.15 Nuclear Age Peace Foundation  
 
 The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation initiates and supports worldwide 
efforts to abolish nuclear weapons, to strengthen the role of international law 
and institutions, and to inspire and empower a new generation of peace 
leaders. Founded in 1982, the Foundation is comprised of individuals and 
organizations worldwide who realize the imperative for peace in the Nuclear 
Age. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-profit, non-partisan 
international education and advocacy organization. It has consultative status 
to the United Nations Economic and Social Council and is recognized by the 
UN as a Peace Messenger Organization. Its Washington D.C. Office is 
located at 322 Fourth Street NE, Washington, DC 20002, Telephone: (202) 
543-4100, ext 105, Fax: (202) 546-5142; and its website is at 
http://www.wagingpeace.org. 
7.16 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
 
 The SIPRI’s mission on export controls and nonproliferation includes 
raising the quality of information and awareness of the current state of 
national and multilateral export control systems in Europe. The SIPRI offers 
insights in to national arms export controls, multilateral export control 
regimes, and international organizations providing support to control efforts 
through its numerous publications and databases. Some of its publications and 
databases are freely available on its website at 
http://www.sipri.org/contents/webmaster/publications. The contact 
information of the institute is: Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden, 
Phone: 46-8-655-97-00; fax: 46-8-655 97 33; e-mail: sipri@sipri.org; and 
website: http://projects.sipri.se/. 
